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A possible solution to the problem in the instant case was given in the
case of Furst v. Brady,9 where the deceased non-resident motorist carried
an insurance policy which protected him from loss due to his automobile
accident. The court there treated the policy as an asset in the state where
the suit was brought and allowed recovery against an ancillary administra-
tor. In the case at hand, the deceased had a similar policy, and the claim-
ants attempted to have an ancillary administrator appointed for purposes
of reaching this policy to satisfy their claims in their home state. The
court did not allow this appointment, and refused to treat the policy as
an asset in the state where suit was brought, thereby turning away from
the above suggested solution.
The increasing use of automobiles and accidents connected therewith
seems to point to the necessity of a new concept in the law, especially since
the more violent the accident the greater the chance of death for those in-
volved. Therefore, the frequency of these deaths will give rise to more and
more actions similar to the instant case. The legislature of Ohio, appre-
ciating these facts and recognizing the need for conferring such jurisdic-
tion, has followed the modern trend and passed an amendment to its so-
called substituted service statute and personal representatives of deceased
non-resident motorists may now be served in that manner.'0 The most
salient aspect of this case lies in the fact that the legislature recognized
the inadequacy in its state law and immediately stepped into the breach
and remedied the situation.
N. A. ZIMMERMAN
CORPORATIONs-ACTIoNs BETwEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND OFFICERS OR
AGENTs-W =ETERm PERSONAL RECOVERY BY FORMER SHAREHOLDER IS
ALLOWABLE IN ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICER FOR MISAPPROPRIATION Or COR-
PoRATE AssETs-The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was recently faced with the problem of whether a former shareholder
might be allowed an individual recovery against an officer of the corpo-
ration in the case of Watson v. Button.' Therein, the former owner of
one-half of the corporate stock brought an action against the former gen-
1939, Art. 56, § 186.189; Mich. Stat. Ann., 1949 Cum. Supp., § 9.2103; Neb. Rev. Stat.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, Art. 5, § 25-530 as amended in 1949; Thompson's Laws N. Y.,
1945 Supp., Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 52, p. 725; Wis. Stats. 1949, Ch. 85 § 85.05(3).
The constitutionality of these statutes has been upheld in such cases as: Plopa v.
DuPre, 327 Mich. 606, 42 N. W. (2d) 777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N. Y. 434,
91 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950).
9375 Ill. 425, 31 N. E. (2d) 606 (1940), noted in 19 CMCAGo-KENT L,&w R~wew
293.
10 Legislative Acts and Joint Resolutions of the State of Ohio, 1955-56, p. 49.
1235 F. (2d) 235 (1956).
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eral manager, who had owned the balance of the stock, to recover the
amount misappropriated by the defendant prior to the sale of the entire
corporate stock to its present owners.2 The district court awarded a per-
sonal judgment for the total amount of the defalcation to the plaintiff and
the reviewing court affirmed when it concluded that an individual recovery
is allowable, as an exception to the general rule, where the parties are
jointly responsible for the corporation's liabilities resulting from such
misappropriations, and the rights of creditors and other shareholders are
not prejudiced.3
Generally, the individual shareholders have no separate and inde-
pendent right of action for injuries suffered by the corporation which
merely result in the depreciation of the value of their stock. 4 Rather, the
wrong is said to be primarily against the corporation, and incidentally
against the owners. A suit to redress such a wrong must instead be brought
by the corporation or by a shareholder in a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation. 5
Any judgment obtained by reason of such wrongs is an asset of the
corporation which inures first to the benefit of creditors,5 and secondly to
the shareholders. This rule is based on the principle that where such an
injury occurs, each shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the
number of shares he owns, and each will be made whole if the corporation
obtains restitution or compensation from the wrongdoer. 6 Since it is usu-
ally conceded that the corporation has a cause of action, direct relief to
the shareholders might double the defendant's liability7 and, if recovery
should be denied the corporation, the conduct of its business and rights
of its creditors might be jeopardized." The single action in favor of the
corporation is also said to be more convenient than the multiplicity of suits
2 In July of 1954, all of the stock was sold to third parties. Defendant secured, as
part of the sale, an agreement from the purchasers to release and discharge him
from any claims and demands existing against him in favor of the corporation, thus
precluding an action by the corporation or its present shareholders to enforce the
corporate cause of action.
3 The court expressly stated that the plaintiff cannot bring a derivative action
since he is no longer a shareholder. However, the court treated this case as a de-
rivative action, and concluded that it falls within an exception to the general rules
of recovery applicable in stockholders' derivative suits.
4 Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 371 (1847), Is the leading case.
5 Green v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. (2d) 378 (1928) ; Smith v. Hurd,
12 Metc. (Mass.) 371 (1847) ; Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S. W. (2d)
216 (1942).
6 Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S. W. (2d) 216 (1942) ; see also the
note in 40 Calif. L. Rev. 127 (1952).
7 White v. First National Bank, 252 Pa. 205, 97 A. 403 (1916).
8 Dorah v. Pensicot County Bank, 213 Mo. App. 541, 256 S. W. 560 (1923) ; Beeber
v. Wilson, 285 Pa. 312, 131 A. 854 (1926).
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which might result from a recognition of direct liability to the share-
holders.9
This general rule is not affected by the mere fact that the complaining
shareholder owns all, or substantially all of the stock, 10 or that the defend-
ant acted with malice toward the individual shareholder, since the ill will
of a wrongdoer toward a stockholder and his motive in wrongdoing does
not change his liability for injuries which remain injuries to the corpora-
tion rather than to the individual shareholder."
This rule is not universal, however. The courts have recognized at
least three situations which raise possible exceptions to the general rule.
The first of these situations arises where the individual has parted with
his shares, without knowledge of the prior wrongful misappropriation of
corporate assets by the directors. It has been held that the individual could
recover from the directors the amount by which the misappropriation had
reduced the value of his prior shareholdings. 12 In these instances, the
former shareholder has been given a personal right of action on the theory
that the misappropriation has wrongfully affected him in a manner dif-
ferent from its effect on the shareholders generally in that he has been
fraudulently induced or coerced into selling his shares.' s
Another situation in which an individual recovery has been allowed
is where it appears that the injury to the shareholder resulted from the
violation of some special relationship, fiduciary or contractual, owed the
shareholder by the wrongdoer. In these instances, although the corpora-
tion also may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong,
the injury has its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiff's
status as a shareholder, and he may maintain an action in his own right
9 Wells v. Dane, 101 Me. 67, 63 A. 324 (1905).
10 L. J. Sigl Inc. v. Bresnahan, 216 App. Div. 634, 215 N. Y. S. 735 (1926) (98%
owership by plaintiff) ; Lockhart v. Moore, 25 Tenn. App. 456, 159 S. W. (2d) 438
(1941) (complete ownership of stock) ; Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp.,
Tex. Com. App., 37 S. W. (2d) 145 (1931) (all but one share held by plaintiff).
11 Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F. (2d) 385 (1931); Green v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 24 F. (2d) 378 (1928) ; Shenberg v. DeGarmo, 61 Cal. App. 326,
143 P. (2d) 74 (1943) ; Compare Stidham v. State Bank, 126 Kans. 336, 268 P. 106
(1928), where recovery was allowed a bank shareholder for slander of the bank
alleged to have been uttered for the purpose of ruining the plaintiff among others.
12 Backus v. Kirsh, 264 Mich. 73, 249 N. W. 469 (1933) ; Coronado Development
Corp. v. Milliken, 175 Misc. 1, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 670 (1940) ; Von Au v. Magenheimer,
126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. S. 629 (1908); Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky
Corp., Tex. Com. App., 37 S. W. (2d) 145 (1931).
Is See note 9, ante, and see Wells v. Dane, 101 Me. 67, 63 A. 324 (1905), where-
in the court said, "That a shareholder has parted with his stock does not deprive
him of his right to sue ... directors who have unlawfully taken advantage of their
position to his detriment."
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in addition to the corporate right of action. 14  Thus, for example, in-
dividual recovery has been awarded where the shareholder was a decedent's
estate, and the defendant its unfaithful administrator,15 or where the
director was a pledgee of the plaintiff's shares.' 6
At this point, it is important to note that the preceding two situa-
tions have dealt with the circumstances under which a direct cause of action
in the shareholder will be enforced in addition to the corporate right of
action. In these instances, although the cause of action may have arisen
out of the transaction whereby the shareholder acquired his stock, or out
of other circumstances dependent on the fact that he owns the stock, he
acts in his individual capacity rather than on behalf of the corpora-
tion; he is personally a party to a contract, or an individual victim of
a tortious injury. 17 It is clear that he has an individual right of action,
and the suit brought by him would not constitute a derivative suit.' s In
the true stockholders derivative suit, the plaintiff is merely an instigator
moving the court to action in behalf of the corporation.19 Thus it can
readily be seen that these instances, referred to as "exceptions", are
not really exceptions at all, but a recognition of the individual's separate
and independent cause of action.
There does exist, however, a true exception to the general rule. In
certain instances, where rights of creditors are not concerned, some courts
have granted a personal judgment in favor of the complaining share-
holder, in lieu of recovery by the corporation, for such injuries where
it appeared that the wrongdoers themselves owned a majority of the
14 Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997 (1919) ; Blazer v.
Black, 196 F. (2d) 139 (1951) ; Cutting v. Bryan, 30 F. (2d) 754 (1929) ; Chase
National Bank v. Sayles, 30 F. (2d) 178 (1927) , Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div.
38, 265 N. Y. S. 172 (1933) ; Kono v. Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260 N. Y. S. 662
(1932) ; Blakeslee v. Sottile, 118 Misc. 513, 194 N. Y. S. 752 (1922) ; General Rubber
Co. v. Benedict, 215 N. Y. 18, 109 N. E. 96 (1915) ; Vierling v. Baxter, 293 Pa. 52,
141 A. 728 (1928) ; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914) ; Cullum v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., Tex. Civ. App., 115 S. W. (2d) 1196 (1938).
15 Matter of Auditore, 249 N. Y. 335, 164 N. E. 242 (1928), wherein it was held
that an administrator of a stockholder's estate was liable in damages to the estate
for reducing the value of the stock because of his violation of trust by taking and
applying to his own use all assets of the corporation of which he was also a director,
and that a judgment for the corporation against such director for misappropriation
of funds was no bar to proceedings against him as administrator for the resulting
loss in value of decedent's stock.
16 Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F. 522 (1897).
17 See Berlack, "Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute", 35 Mich. L. Rev.
597 (1937).
's See 18 C. J. S.. Corporation, § 559, p. 1272; Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corpora-
tions, Vol. 13, § 5921.
19 See cases cited In note 5, ante.
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corporate stock, 2° or where the majority of the shareholders assented
to the alleged misconduct.2 1 In all such cases, the courts have, as a short
cut to justice, directed the payment to the objecting shareholder of his
proportionate share of the amount found to be due to the corporation,
on the theory that where substantially all other shareholders were defend-
ants, or in pari delicto with them, to allow them the benefits resulting
from a judgment in favor of the corporation would be to violate the
"clean hands" doctrine. Some courts, however, have rejected this theory
on the ground that to permit the defendants to retain part of the funds,
in proportion to the stock of ratifying shareholder, would tend to en-
courage fraud, and would, in effect, permit ratification of illegal acts.
22
The court, in the instant case, apparently felt that a former share-
holder, who parted with his shares without knowledge of the prior mis-
appropriation of corporate assets by the directors, may recover personally
where the rights of creditors or other shareholders are not prejudiced.
This apparent limitation upon the individual's right of recovery seems
quite unnecessary in this type of situation. As has been pointed out
previously, 23 in these instances, the plaintiff is suing in his individual
capacity and not on behalf of the corporation, thereby obviating any
possible objections a corporate creditor might raise to a personal re-
covery by the shareholder. The court could more properly have decided
the instant case by recognizing the plaintiff's individual cause of action
against the errant director 24 instead of erroneously treating the problem
as an exception to the general rule.
S. P. ZISooK
20 Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N. Y. S. 912 (1937) ; Eaton v.
Robinson, 19 R. I. 146, 32 A. 339 (1895) ; Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 P.
29 (1921).
21 Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523i 100 A. 645 (1917). See also
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 13, § 6028.
22 Keenan v. Eshelman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A. (2d) 904 (1938), 120 A. L. R. 227;
Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 125 App. Div. 881, 110 N. Y. S. 806 (1908) ; Baillie
v. Columbia Gold Mining Co., 86 Ore. 1, 166 P. 965 (1917) : see Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of Corporations, Vol. 13, § 6028; and note in 23 Minn. L. Rev. 973. Of particular
importance to the Illinois practitioner is the fact that the law in this state is far
from well settled. In Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N. E. 863 (1897), the
court treated the misappropriated money as a fund out of which dividends should
be declared, and awarded the innocent shareholders their proportionate share of the
amount due to the corporation. In Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing Co. v. Bog-
giano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17 (1903), and in Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 91
N. E. 1056 (1910), the court refused to follow the rule announced in the DeYoung
case. However, it appears that the facts of the latter cases differ from those of
the former in that the rights of creditors might have been prejudiced in the
Boggiano and the Voorhees cases if an individual recovery by the shareholders had
been allowed; however, in the DeYoung case, the creditors were adequately pro-
tected by existing corporate assets.
23 See notes 9 and 10, ante.
24 See note 10, ante.
